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We examine the e¤ect of an imperfect audit and a subsequent appeals process in a
standard adverse selection problem when legal or institutional restrictions impose an upper
bound on penalties. We show that the imperfect audit always reduces the agents infor-
mation rent and enhances e¢ ciency despite the limited liability. A subsequent appeals
process, which allows the agent to challenge an unfavorable nding by the audit, is never
optimal when it is costless. However, when the appeals process is costly, it can be optimal
even if it is less accurate than the audit. Moreover, social welfare can increase as the cost
of the appeals process increases.
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JEL classication: D8, L5
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1 Introduction
In standard adverse-selection problems, such as La¤ont and Tirole (1986), a principal (e.g.,
a regulator) contracts with a risk-neutral agent (e.g., a rm) who is privately informed of its
inherent cost of production. The optimal contract for the principal eliminates all rent for a
high-cost agent and a¤ords positive rent to a low-cost agent, and it distorts the production
from their e¢ cient levels.
In many circumstances, information that is correlated with the agents private informa-
tion can be made public ex post, for example, by an imperfect audit. If the principal can
impose unlimited penalty on the agent whenever the ex post information is inconsistent
with the agents earlier revelation of its private information, Baron and Besanko (1984)
and Riordan and Sappington (1988) among others show that all of the agents rent can be
eliminated and e¢ cient production can be achieved.
However, in practice, legal or institutional restrictions often impose upper bounds on the
size of penalties. For example, administrative laws often specify the maximum punishments
for violations, and bankruptcy clauses e¤ectively restrict the size of penalties to be no more
than ones asset.
Moreover, with imperfect ex post information, an agent who has truthfully revealed its
private information could be penalized by mistake. In practice, an agent who disagrees
with the punishment might be able to challenge the decision. In fact, the appeals process is
widely employed by organizations, such as administrative agencies, regulatory authorities,
and rms, as a means of error correction.
This paper examines the e¤ect of imperfect auditing and a subsequent appeals process
in a principal-agent relationship when legal or institutional restrictions impose an upper
bound on penalties. We show that the imperfect auditing always reduces the agents
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information rent and enhances e¢ ciency despite the limited liability. However, when the
audit is su¢ ciently inaccurate and the penalty is restricted to be su¢ ciently small, the
principal can no longer eliminate all of the agents rent or achieve e¢ cient production.
The subsequent appeals process, which allows the agent to challenge an unfavorable
nding by the audit, enhances e¢ ciency only if it is more accurate than the audit when it
is costless. However, we show that it is optimal for the principal to eliminate the appeals
process and simply replace the audit with the more accurate investigation, if a more ac-
curate investigation is available. Consequently, implementing the appeals process is never
optimal when it is costless.
However, when the appeals process is costly, implementing the appeals process can be
optimal even if it is less accurate than the audit. This is because the appellants share
of the cost can be viewed as a forfeitable bond that must be posted in order to appeal.
The forfeitable bond helps separate di¤erent types of agents through the appeals process.
We also nd that it is optimal for the principal to impose all the cost of appeals on the
appellant and the expected social welfare can increase as the cost of the appeals process
increases.
Our research relates to several studies on limited liability. Lawarrée and Van Audenrode
(1992) examine the e¤ect of limited liability in a similar setting as ours. They show that an
imperfect audit, which could mistakenly penalize an honest agent, is never protable for the
principal if limited liability requires that an honest agent cannot receive a negative rent. In
contrast, we show that an imperfect audit is always valuable for the principal when limited
liability is in the form of an upper bound on penalties. Sappington (1983) examines the
optimal strategy of the principal when limits are imposed on the maximum penalty. While
Sappington considers a case with ex ante symmetric information, we analyze a case with ex
ante asymmetric information. Moreover, we consider the e¤ect of imperfect auditing and
the appeals process.
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Our research also relates to the literature on the appeals process. Shavell (1995) studies
the role of the appeals process as a means of error correction in judicial settings where
either litigant disappointed with a rst-order decision can seek reconsideration before a
higher tribunal. In contrast, we study the role of the appeals process in a principal-agent
setting where an agent can seek the principals reconsideration of her initial decision. Dai
(2008) examines the dual role of the appeals process in enhancing fairness and inducing
performance in principal-agent relationships in the presence of imperfect performance eval-
uation. Spitzer and Talley (2000) analyze a hierarchical system of judicial auditing where
an appeals court is concerned with not only imprecision but also ideological bias of a trial
court.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the central elements
of the model. Section 3 demonstrates the e¤ect of imperfect auditing in the presence of
limited liability. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ect of a subsequent appeals process. Section 5
summarizes the main ndings and concludes the paper with future research directions.
2 Elements of the model
As in La¤ont and Tirole (1986) (L&T henceforth), a utilitarian regulator (the principal)
wishes to realize a public project with social value S. A single risk-neutral rm (the agent)
can realize the project, at a total cost c =  e, where  is the rms cost parameter for the
project and e is its e¤ort. The regulator cannot observe either the rms cost parameter





with  >  and Pr( = ) = v (therefore Pr( = ) = 1   v). The
rms cost of e¤ort is  (e) with  0(e) > 0;  00(e) > 0; and  000(e) > 0. The total production
cost is observable to the regulator and is reimbursed to the rm by the regulator. The rm
is also compensated by a net monetary transfer t in addition to the reimbursement of cost.
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The rms prot function is   t   (e).









for  = . For notation simplicity, let
t  t(), c  c(),   t()   (   C); t  t(), c  c(), and   t()   (   C).
We assume that the regulator can raise public fund only through a distortionary mech-
anism, and  > 0 denotes the shadow cost of public fund. Then the expected consumer
surplus is S   (1 + )fv(t+ c) + (1  v)[t+ c]g. The expected social welfare of the project,
W , is the aggregation of the expected consumer surplus and the expected prot of the rm.
Therefore,
W = S   (1 + )[v(t+ c) + (1  v)(t+ c)] + [v + (1  v)] (1)
= S   v[t+ (1 + )c+  (   c)]  (1  v)[t+ (1 + )c+  (   c)]:
Suppose that the regulator can observe the rms cost parameter at the time of con-
tracting, then the optimal contract would be characterized by the following equations:
 0(   c) =  0(   c) = 1; (2)
t =  (   c); and (3)
t =  0(   c): (4)
In words, under the optimal contract, both types of rms would deliver the e¢ cient level
of e¤ort and receive zero rent. For later use, we dene e     c =    c, i.e., e is the
e¢ cient level of e¤ort for both types of rms.
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3 Imperfect auditing
After the completion of the project, the regulator audits the rms cost parameter with
probability 0 6  6 1 when the rm has claimed to have high cost parameter. The
audit correctly reveals the rms cost parameter with a probability r, where 1 > r > 1=2.
However, with probability 1  r, the regulator mistakenly accuses an actual high-cost rm
as a cheating low-cost rm. If the rm is accused of cheating, it is punished with a penalty
p. Institutional or legal restrictions impose an upper bound L > 0 on the size of penalty,
i.e., p 6 L. For simplicity, the audit is assumed to be costless.
The timing of the model is as follows: 1) The regulator o¤ers a contract specifying a
transfer-cost pair for each type of rm. 2) The rm announces its cost parameter . 3) The
rm delivers e¤ort and the total cost is observed. 4) exchange takes place according to the
contract. 5) The regulator performs an audit with probability  if the rm has reported ,
and imposes a penalty p on the rm if it is found to have exaggerated its cost parameter.
We abstract from the appeals process until section 4.
With imperfect auditing, the expected social welfare of the project becomes
W = S   v[t+ (1 + )c+  (   c)]
 (1  v)[(t  (1  r)p) + (1 + )c+  (   c)]. (5)
We assume the social value of the project is so large that the regulator always wishes
to realize the project. The rm will participate in a contract if and only if its expected
prot from the contract is nonnegative. Therefore, the regulatory policy must satisfy the
following individual rationality conditions:
 = t  (1  r)p   (   c) > 0; and (6)
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 = t   (   c) > 0: (7)
To ensure that the rm truthfully reveals its cost parameter for the project, the transfer-
cost pair designed for a type  (respectively a type ) rm must be the one preferred by a
type  (respectively a type ) rm. Therefore, the regulatory policy must also satisfy the
following incentive compatibility conditions:
t  (1  r)p   (   c) > t   (   c); and (8)
t   (   c) > t   (   c)  rp: (9)
Finally, the regulatory policy must comply with the restriction on the size of penalty:
p 6 L. (10)
The regulators optimization problem is choosing fc; c; t; t; ; pg to maximize the ex-
pected social welfare, W , subject to conditions (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10).
The optimal regulatory policy depends on the accuracy of the audit and the restriction
on the size of penalty. Dene  (e)   (e)    (e   ) where      . (Since
 00(e) > 0 and  000(e) > 0; it can be readily shown that  0 > 0 and  00 > 0.) When
L >  (e)=(2r   1) or r > 1=2 +  (e)=2L , the regulator can impose a su¢ ciently
large penalty on an accused rm or the audit is su¢ ciently accurate. In this case, the
regulator can implement the e¢ cient contract fc = c; c = c; t =  (  c); t =  (  c)g
by auditing with some probability 0 <  < 1. Under the contract, both types of rms
deliver the e¢ cient level of e¤ort and receive no rent for their private information on cost
parameters.
However, when L <  (e)=(2r   1) or r > 1=2 +  (e)=2L, the regulator can no
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longer implement the above e¢ cient contract. In this case, the regulator always performs
the audit ( = 1) as long as she can impose any positive penalty on an accused rm.
Under the optimal auditing policy, a low-cost rm delivers the e¢ cient level of e¤ort but
a high-cost rm delivers a less than e¢ cient level of e¤ort. Let e(< e) denote the
optimal level of e¤ort for a high-cost rm in the absence of auditing (as in L&T). Under
the optimal auditing policy, both types of rms receive no rent and a high-cost rm delivers
a level of e¤ort between e and e when  (e)=(2r   1) < L <  (e)=(2r   1). When
L <  (e)=(2r   1), a high-cost rm delivers the e¤ort e and receives no rent but a
low-cost rm receives a positive rent (which is smaller than that in L&T).
We summarize the above properties of the optimal contract under imperfect auditing
in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The regulator always audits with some positive probability, and the e¢ cient
outcomes can be achieved when L >  (e)=(2r   1). When L <  (e)=(2r   1), the
regulator audits with certainty ( = 1), and a low-cost rm delivers the e¢ cient level of
e¤ort but a high-cost rm delivers less than the e¢ cient level of e¤ort; the auditing mitigates
a low-cost rms information rent and enhances e¢ ciency.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is the following. The auditing penalizes a cheating
low-cost rm with probability r and mistakenly punishes a high-cost rm with probability
1 r. Since a high-cost rm receives no rent in the optimal contract, the regulator must fully
compensate the high-cost rm for the expected mistaken punishment in order to induce its
participation. Therefore, the audit reduces the low-cost rms expected rent of mimicking
a high-cost rm by (2r 1)p if the regulator can impose a positive penalty, p, on an accused
rm. When the penalty is su¢ ciently large, the existence of auditing can fully prevent a
low-cost rm from mimicking a high-cost rm and the regulator can achieve the e¢ cient
outcome.
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However, when the regulator cannot impose a large penalty on an accused rm (i.e.,
L <  (e)=(2r   1)), the auditing alone can no longer fully deter a low-cost rm from
exaggerating its cost parameter. The regulator has to distort the e¤ort level of a high-cost
rm downwards to mitigate a low-cost rms incentive to mimic a high-cost one. Moreover,
the e¤ort distortion must be increased accordingly as the size of the penalty decreases.
When the size of penalty is very limited (i.e., L <  (e)=(2r   1)), it is no longer
optimal for the regulator to further distort the e¤ort level of a high-cost rm. Then the
regulator optimally a¤ords a low-cost rm a positive rent to induce truthful information
revelation.
To best demonstrate the e¤ect of the appeals process, the rest of the paper focuses on
situations where the limits on liability are constraining. In other words, Assumption 1 is
made for the rest of the paper:
Assumption 1 L <  (e)=(2r   1).
Since Proposition 1 shows that the regulator audits with certainty (i.e.,  = 1) when
L <  (e)=(2r   1), we consider  = 1 for the rest of our analysis.
4 An Appeals Process
In this section we consider an appeals process subsequent to the auditing. Suppose with
probability  the rm can lodge an appeal when it is accused of cheating by the audit. Upon
the rms appeal, the regulator launches an investigation into the rms cost parameter.
The investigation correctly reveals the rms cost parameter with probability a > 1=2. The
regulator removes the original penalty if the investigation reveals that the rm is innocent,
but upholds the original penalty if the investigation conrms the original accusation. Let
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Z denote the total cost of the appeals process and  denote the regulators share of the
cost.
In the presence of the appeals process, the expected social welfare becomes
W  S   vft+ (1 + )c+  (   c)g   (1 + )(1  v)(1  r)Z
 (1  v)f[t  (1  r)((1  a)p+ (1  )Z)] + (1 + )c+  (   c)g. (11)
The individual rationality conditions which guarantee the participation of both types
of rms become
 = t  (1  r)[(1  a)p+ (1  )Z]   (   c) > 0; (12)
and  = t   (   c) > 0: (13)
An innocent high-cost rm will appeal the penalty only if the expected benet ap (the
penalty is removed with probability a) exceeds its cost of appealing (1   )Z. Therefore,
the appeals process must satisfy the following condition in order to induce an innocent
high-cost rm to appeal:
ap > (1  )Z (14)
The following incentive compatibility conditions induce both types of rms to truthfully
announce their cost parameters:
t  (1  r)[(1  a)p+ (1  )Z]   (   c) > t   (   c); and (15)
t   (   c) > t   (   c)  r[p  maxf0; (1  a)p  (1  )Zg]: (16)
Notice that a cheating low-cost rm will appeal only if the expected benet (1   a)p
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(the penalty is removed with probability 1  a) exceeds its cost of appealing (1  )Z.
The regulators optimization problem is choosing fc; c; t; t; ; pg to maximize the ex-
pected social welfare, W , subject to conditions (10), (12), (13), (14), (15), and (16).
4.1 A costless appeals process
As a benchmark, we rst consider an appeals process involving no cost (i.e., Z = 0). In
this case, as we demonstrate below, the e¤ect of the appeals process depends solely on its
accuracy relative to the accuracy of the auditing.
The rst-order conditions regarding c; c; t; and t are given by
$c = (1  v)[ 0(   c)  (1 + )] + 1 0(   c)  3 0(   c) = 0; (17)
$c = v[ 
0(   c)  (1 + )] + 2 0(   c) + 3 0(   c) = 0; (18)
$t =  (1  v)+ 1   3 = 0; (19)
$t =  v+ 2 + 3 = 0; and (20)
where 1, 2, and 3 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (12), (13),
and (16), respectively. Since equation (15) suggests 1 = (1 v)+3, the rst-derivative
regarding  is
$ = [1   (1  v)](1  r)ap  3r(1  a)p
= 3(a  r)p: (21)
The optimal appeals process depends on the accuracy of the appeals process. When
It can be veried that the solution of the optimization problem under conditions (10), (6), (7), and (8)
satises condition (9).
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a > r + [ (e)   (2r   1)L]=L = (1   r) +  (e)=L, (i.e., the appeals process is
su¢ ciently more accurate than the audit,) the regulator can enforce the e¢ cient contract
fc = c; c = c; t =  (   c); t =  (   c)g by implementing the appeals process with
some probability 0 <  < 1. Notice that [ (e)  (2r   1)L]=L > 0 under Assumption 1.
When a < (1  r) + (e)=L, however, constraint (16) becomes binding (3 > 0) and
the regulator can no longer implement the e¢ cient contract as a result. Then equation
(21) indicates that $ ? 0 if a ? r. In words, the regulator implements the appeals process
with certainty ( = 1) if it is more accurate than the audit, but eliminates the appeals
process completely if otherwise. In this case, a low-cost rm delivers the e¢ cient level of
e¤ort but a high-cost rm delivers less than the e¢ cient level of e¤ort.
The above ndings suggest that the regulator implements the appeals process with
positive probability only if it is more accurate than the audit. We state this property of
the appeals process in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The costless appeals process is valuable only if it is more accurate than the
audit.
The e¤ect of the appeals process is two-fold. On one hand it may correctly remove a
mistaken punishment on a high-cost rm; on the other hand, it may mistakenly remove a
correct penalty on a cheating low-cost rm. The former e¤ect in expectation reduces the
mistaken punishment on a high-cost rm by (1   r)ap: However, the latter e¤ect reduces
a cheating low-cost rms expected penalty by r(1  a)p. When the appeals process is less
accurate than the audit (i.e., a < r), r(1  a)p > (1  r)ap and the latter e¤ect dominates
the former. In this case, the appeals process actually increases a low-cost rms incentive
to cheat. Therefore, the appeals process is valuable only if it is more accurate than the
audit.
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However, as we demonstrate below, if the regulator can undertake a more accurate
investigation in the appeals process, the regulator would be better o¤ by eliminating the
appeals process and implementing the more accurate investigation in the audit.
To demonstrate the idea, we dene r = a   r. Hence, from the above discussion,
the appeals process (when implemented with certainty) reduces the low-cost rms rent
from mimicking a high-cost one by I  (1   r)ap   r(1   a)p  rp. Suppose the
regulator implements the more accurate investigation in the audit. From our discussion
in the previous section, the more accurate audit (when implemented with certainty) could
reduce the low-cost rms information rent by [2(r+r)  1]p among which 2rp (> I)
is due to the increase in accuracy. Therefore, implementing the more accurate investigation
in the audit leads to lower information rent for a low-cost rm than the appeals process
does.
The intuition is the following. When the more accurate investigation is in the audit, the
more accurate audit convicts a cheating low-cost rm with probability r +r and a high-
cost rm with probability 1  (r+r). In constrast, when the more accurate investigation
is in the appeals process, eventually a cheating low-cost rm is punished with probability
ra and a high-cost rm with probability (1   r)(1   a). Since (r +r)   (1   r  r) >
ra (1 r)(1 a) for a > r, the increased accuracy in the auditing increases the probability
of punishing a cheating low-cost rm more than the appeals process does. Consequently,
a more accurate audit is more e¤ective than a more accurate appeals process in inducing
truthful information from a low-cost rm.
Proposition 2 suggests that the appeals process becomes redundant when the regulator
implements the more accurate investigation in the audit. Consequently, it is never optimal
to implement the costless appeals process. We present this nding in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 It is never optimal to implement a costless appeals process.
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4.2 A costly appeals process
When the appeals process is costly, the e¤ect of the appeals process depends on both the
cost and the accuracy of the appeals process and on how the cost is allocated between
the regulator and the appellant. Proposition 4 characterizes the optimal cost allocation
between the regulator and the rm in the appeals process.
Proposition 4 It is optimal for the principal to impose all the cost of the appeals process
on the appellant.y
The intuition underlying Proposition 4 is as follows. A cheating low-cost rm is less
likely to be found innocent in the appeals process than a high-cost rm is. In other words, a
cheating low-cost rms expected benet of appealing (the penalty is removed when found
innocent) is smaller than that of a high-cost rm. Hence, imposing a larger share of the cost
on the appellant can help deter a cheating low-cost rm from appealing. The appellants
cost of appealing can be viewed as a forfeitable bond that must be posted in order to
appeal. The forfeitable bond helps separate di¤erent types of rms in the appeals process.
When the cost of the appeals process is substantial, the regulator can make a cheating
low-cost rm indi¤erent between appealing or not (i.e., (1  a)p = (1  )Z) by imposing
a su¢ ciently large share of the cost on the appellant. After that point, further increase
in the appellants share of cost has no e¤ect on social welfare. This is because after that
point only a mistakenly accused high-cost rm has the incentive to appeal. Ultimately the
regulator must compensate a high-cost rms cost of appealing in the contract in order to
yNote the cost of the appeals process can be non-monetary resources such as time and e¤ort needed
to collect supporting evidence. Proposition 2 suggests that it can be optimal to impose a larger burden
of proof on the appellant. It also suggests that, in a regulatory setting, the fact that regulatory hearings
usually consume considerable time and resources does not necessarily imply that the process is ine¢ cient.
This o¤ers another explanation for regulatory bureaucracy. Sappington (1986) shows that regulatory
bureaucracy, which hinders the regulators ability to discern the rms costs, creates incentives for the rm
to reduce costs when the regulator does not have commitment power.
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induce its participation. Therefore, the regulator at least weakly prefers the appellant to
bear all the cost of the appeals process.
Although Proposition 4 suggests that it is optimal for the regulator to impose all the cost
of the appeals process on the appellant, the regulator is often restricted from doing so for
political or institutional reasons. Therefore we will consider  as exogenous for the regulator
in our analysis. Moreover, we will limit our analysis to the case of (1  a)p > (1  )Z to
better demonstrate the e¤ect of  on the merit of the appeals process.
The rst-order conditions of the regulators optimization problem regarding c; c; t; and
t are given by equations (17), (18), (19), and (20). The rst-derivative regarding  is
$ = 3(a  r)p+ [3(1  )(2r   1)  (1  v)(1  r)(1 + )]Z: (22)
The regulator implements the appeals process with certainty (i.e.,  = 1) if $ > 0 but
eliminates it completely if $ < 0. A comparison of equations (21) and (22) shows that
the rst term on the right-hand side of equation (22) measures the accuracy e¤ect of the
appeals process and the second term measures the cost e¤ect of the appeals process. Notice
that now the appeals process can be valuable (i.e., $ > 0) even if it is less accurate than
the auditing (i.e., a < r) when the cost e¤ect of the appeals process is positive.
When the appeals process is costly, the regulator must balance production e¢ ciency,
rent extraction and the cost of appeals process. Consequently, the regulator no longer
enforces the e¢ cient contract fc = c; c = c; t =  (   c); t =  (   c)g regardless of
the accuracy and the cost of the appeals process. In the optimal contract, a low-cost rm
delivers the e¢ cient level of e¤ort but a high-cost rm delivers less than the e¢ cient level
of e¤ort.
When a > (1 r)+[ (e) (2r 1)(1 )Z]=L, either the appeals process is su¢ ciently
accurate or the cost of appealing, (1  )Z , is su¢ ciently large for the appellant. (Notice
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that the right-hand side of the above inequality decreases as (1   )Z increases.) In this
case, both types of rms receive no rent and a high-cost rm is required to deliver a level
of e¤ort between e and e:
When a < (1  r) + [ (e)  (2r  1)(1  )Z]=L, a high-cost rm delivers the e¤ort
e and receives no rent but a low-cost rm receives a positive rent (which is smaller than
that in L&T). The cost e¤ect of the appeals process can be best demonstrated in this case.
Since equation (20) indicates 3 = v in this case, the cost e¤ect of the appeals process as
indicated in equation (22) is v(1  )(2r   1)Z   (1  v)(1  r)(1 + )Z.
The rst term demonstrates the positive e¤ect of the cost of the appeals process. Since
a high-cost rm is accused with probability 1   r and a cheating low-cost rm is accused
with probability r by the audit, their expected costs of appealing are r(1   )Z and (1  
r)(1   )Z, respectively. Hence, the cost of the appeals process helps reduce the low-cost
rms rent from cheating by (2r  1)(1  )Z and increase the social welfare of the project
by v(1  )(2r   1)Z.
The second term demonstrates the negative e¤ect of the cost of the appeals process. At
equilibrium, only a mistakenly accused high-cost rm appeals. Therefore, an appeal occurs
with probability (1  v)(1  r) and then the expected social cost of the appeals process is
(1 v)(1 r)(1+)Z. (Although the regulator bears only a share of the cost of the appeals
process, she ultimately must compensate a high-cost rms cost of appealing in order to
induce its participation).
The cost e¤ect of the appeals process is positive when v(1  )(2r   1) > (1  v)(1 
r)(1 + ). More interestingly, the social welfare of the project increases as the cost of
the appeals process increases in this case. Notice that this case arises when v and r are
su¢ ciently large and  is su¢ ciently small. This is because of the following two reasons.
First, rent extraction becomes more important as the rm is more likely to be of low-cost.
Second, the cost of the appeals process has a larger impact on a cheating low-cost rm as
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the audit becomes more accuracy (so a cheating low-cost rm is more likely to be penalized
by the auditing and utilize the appeals process) and the appellant is required to bear a
larger share of the cost of appealing.
We summarize the above ndings regarding the costly appeals process in Proposition
4.
Proposition 5 When L <  (e)=(2r   1) and the appeals process is costly, a) the reg-
ulator no longer implements the e¢ cient contract regardless of the accuracy and the cost
of the appeals process; b) the appeals process can be valuable even if it is less accurate than
the auditing; c) social welfare can increase as the cost of the appeals process increases.
5 Conclusion
It is well established that in standard adverse selection problems information rent can be
eliminated and e¢ cient production can be achieved when information that is correlated
with the agents private information can be made public ex post. However, the conclusion
is drawn based on two assumptions. First, the principal can impose unlimited penalty on
the agent when the ex post information is inconsistent with the agents earlier revelation
of its private information. Second, the agent cannot challenge the penalty even if it has in
fact truthfully revealed its private information.
We introduce an imperfect audit and a subsequent appeals process into a standard
adverse selection problem when legal or institutional restrictions impose an upper bound
on penalties. We show that the imperfect audit always reduces the agents information rent
and enhances e¢ ciency despite the limited liability. However, when the audit is su¢ ciently
inaccurate and the penalty is restricted to be su¢ ciently small, the principal can no longer
eliminate all of the agents rent or achieve e¢ cient production. The subsequent appeals
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process is never optimal when it is costless. However, when the appeals process is costly,
we show that it can be optimal even if it is less accurate than the audit. Moreover, social
welfare can increase as the cost of the appeals process increases.
Our analysis focuses on the e¤ect of the appeals process on the agents information
revelation in adverse selection problems. We have ignored other possible merits of the
appeals process. For example, Shavell (2006) shows that the appeals process constitutes a
threat to adjudicators who would make socially undesirable decisions and therefore leads
to the making of better decisions by adjudicators. Dai (2008) demonstrates the value of
the appeals process when agent is averse to unfairness caused by evaluation errors. Future
research that includes other merits of the appeals process into our consideration will be
interesting.
6 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1.
The Lagrangian of the regulators problem is
$ = S   v[t+ (1 + )c+  (   c)]  (1  v)[(t  (1  r)p) + (1 + )c+  (   c)]
+1[t  (1  r)[(1  a)p+ (1  )Z]   (   c)] + 2[t   (   c)]
+3[t   (   c)  t+  (   c) + rp] + 4[L  p]; (23)
where 1, 2, 3, and 4 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (6), (7),
(8), and (10), respectively.z
The rst-order conditions regarding c; c; t; t, p, and  are given by
$c = (1  v)[ 0(   c)  (1 + )] + 1 0(   c)  3 0(   c) = 0; (24)
zIt can be veried that the solution of the optimization problem under conditions (10), (6), (7), and (8)
satises condition (9).
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$c = v[ 
0(   c)  (1 + )] + 2 0(   c) + 3 0(   c) = 0; (25)
$t =  (1  v)+ 1   3 = 0; (26)
$t =  v+ 2 + 3 = 0; and (27)
$p = (1  v)(1  r)  1(1  r) + 3r   4 = 0: (28)
The rst-derivative regarding  is
$ = [(1  v)  1](1  r)p+ 3rp: (29)
There are two valid cases to be analyzed.
Case 1. 4 = 0.
When 4 = 0, equations (26) and (28) together provides 3 = 0. Then equation (26)
indicates 1 = (1  v) > 0 and equation (27) indicates 2 = v > 0. Then constraints (6)
and (7) suggest that t  (1  r)p =  (  c) and t =  (  c). Substituting 1 and 2 into
(24) provides  0(   c) = 1; and substituting 2 and 3 into (25) provides  0(   c) = 1.
The condition 3 = 0 requires that constraint (8) must hold at p = L and  = 1, which
amounts to require that r > 1=2 +  (e)=2L.
Case 2. 4 > 0.
When 4 > 0, equations (26) and (28) together provides 3 = 4=[(2r  1)] > 0. Then
equation (26) indicates 1 = (1  v) + 3 > 0 and equation (27) indicates 2 = v  3.
Equation (24) provides
(1  v)(1 + )[ 0(   c)  1] = 3[ 0(   c)   0(   c)] < 0; (30)
which implies  0(  c) < 1; and equation (25) provides  0(  c) = 1. Moreover, equation
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(29) provides $ = 3(2r   1)p > 0, i.e.,  = 1.
Two sub-cases arise when 4 > 0..
Subcase 2.1. 2 = 0.
Since 3 = v when 2 = 0, equation (27) provides
(1  v)(1 + )[ 0(   c)  1] = v[ 0(   c)   0(   c)], (31)
which is the solution in a standard adverse selection without auditing. Let c denote the
solution to the above equation. Then constraint (8) provides
t =  (   c) +  (e)  (2r   1)L, (32)
which suggests that the auditing reduces the low-cost rms information rent. The condition
2 = 0 and 3 > 0 requires that r < 1=2 +  (e
)=2L.
Subcase 2.2. 2 > 0






00(e)  (1  v)(1 + ) 00(   c) > 0. (33)
Therefore, 3 < v suggests that c < c
. Then the binding constraint (8) provides a =
1=2 +  (e)=(2L) > 1=2 +  (e)=(2L).
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7 Appendix B: A Costless Appeals Process
The Lagrangian of the regulators problem is
$ = S   v[t+ (1 + )c+  (   c)]  (1  v)[(t  (1  r)(1  a)p)
+(1 + )c+  (   c)] + 1[t  (1  a)p   (   c)] + 2[t   (   c)] (34)
+3[t   (   c)  t+  (   c) + r(1  (1  a))p] + 4[L  p]: (35)
The rst-order conditions regarding c; c; t; t, and p are given by
$c = (1  v)[ 0(   c)  (1 + )] + 1 0(   c)  3 0(   c) = 0; (36)
$c = v[ 
0(   c)  (1 + )] + 2 0(   c) + 3 0(   c) = 0; (37)
$t =  (1  v)+ 1   3 = 0; (38)
$t =  v+ 2 + 3 = 0; and (39)
$p = [(1  v)  1](1  r)(1  a) + 3r[1  (1  a)]  4 = 0. (40)
The rst-derivative regarding  is
$ = [(1   (1  v))(1  r)a  3r(1  a)]p. (41)
There are two valid cases to be analyzed.
Case 1. 4 = 0.
When 4 = 0, equations (38) and (40) together provides 3 = 0. Then equation (38)
indicates 1 = (1   v) > 0 and equation (39) indicates 2 = v > 0. Then constraints
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(12) and (13) suggest that t   (1   a)p =  (   c) and t =  (   c). Substituting 1
and 2 into (36) provides  
0(   c) = 1; and substituting 2 and 3 into (37) provides
 0(   c) = 1.
The condition 3 = 0 requires that constraint (8) must hold at p = L and  = 1, which
amounts to require that a > (1  r) +  (e)=L.
Case 2. 4 > 0.
When 4 > 0, equations (38) and (40) together provides 3 = 4=[r(1  (1 a))  (1 
r)(1   a)] > 0. Then equation (38) indicates 1 = (1   v) + 3 > 0 and equation (39)
indicates 2 = v  3. Equation (36) provides
(1  v)(1 + )[ 0(   c)  1] = 3[ 0(   c)   0(   c)] < 0; (42)
which implies  0(  c) < 1; and equation (38) provides  0(  c) = 1. Moreover, equation
(41) provides $ = 3[(1  r)a  r(1  a)]p > 0, i.e.,  = 1.
Two sub-cases arise when 4 > 0.
Subcase 2.1. 2 = 0.
Since 1 =  and 3 = v when 2 = 0, equation (27) provides
(1  v)(1 + )[ 0(   c)  1] = v[ 0(   c)   0(   c)], (43)
which suggests c = c. Then constraint (13) provides
t =  (   c) +  (e)  (a+ r   1)L. (44)
The condition 2 = 0 and 3 > 0 requires that a < (1  r) +  (e)=L.
Subcase 2.2. 2 > 0
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When 2 > 0, 3 = v 2 < v. From equation (42), we have dc=d3 > 0. Therefore,
3 < v suggests that c < c
. Then the binding constraint (8) provide a = (1   r) +
 (e)=L > (1  r) +  (e)=L.
8 Appendix C: A Costly Appeals Process
The Lagrangian of the regulators problem is
$ = S   v[t+ (1 + )c+  (   c)]  (1  v)[(t  (1  r)(1  a)p)
+(1 + )c+  (   c) + (1  r)Z(1 + )] (45)
+1[t  (1  r)[(1  a)p+ (1  )Z]   (   c)] + 2[t   (   c)]
+3[t   (   c)  t+  (   c) + r(p  maxf0; (1  a)p  (1  )Zg)] + 4[L  p]:(46)
Suppose that (1   a)p > (1   )Z, then the rst-order conditions regarding c; c; t; t,
and p are the same as those in the case of a costless appeals process. The rst-derivative
regarding  is
$ = [(1   (1  v))(1  r)a  (1  v)(1  r)a  3r(1  a)]p (47)
+[(3r   1(1  r))(1  )  (1  v)(1  r)(1 + )]Z.
Suppose the regulator can choose . Then the rst-order condition regarding  is
$ = [3r + 1(1  r)  (1  v)(1  r))]Z. (48)
There are two cases to be analyzed.
Case 1. 4 = 0.
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When 4 = 0, we have 3 = 0, 1 = (1   v) > 0, and 2 = v > 0 as shown in
Appendix B. Then equation (47) suggests $ =  (1   v)(1   r)(1 + )Z < 0, i.e.,  = 0.
However, Appendix A shows that in the absence of the appeals process 4 > 0 when
L <  (e)=(2r   1).
Therefore, this case is no longer valid.
Case 2. 4 > 0.
When 4 > 0, we have 3 > 0, 1 = (1  v) + 3 > 0; and 2 = v  3 as shown in
Appendix B. Then equation (48) provides $ = 3Z > 0 as long as  > 0, which proves
Proposition 3. Moreover, equation (41) provides
$ = 3(a  r)p+ [3(2r   1)(1  )  (1  v)(1  r)(1 + )]Z: (49)
Therefore, even if a < r, we have $ > 0 and  = 1 if.[3(2r 1)(1 )  (1  v)(1  r)(1+
)]Z > 3(r a)p. In this case, $Z = [(3r 1(1 r))(1 )  (1 v)(1 r)(1+)] > 0,
which suggests that social welfare increases in Z by the envelope theorem.
In addition, equation (36) implies  0( c) < 1; and equation (38) provides  0( c) = 1.
Two sub-cases arise when 4 > 0.
Subcase 2.1. 2 = 0.
Since 1 =  and 3 = v when 2 = 0, equation (27) provides
(1  v)(1 + )[ 0(   c)  1] = v[ 0(   c)   0(   c)], (50)
which suggests c = c. Then constraint (13) provides
t =  (   c) +  (e) + (1  2r   (a  r))L+ (1  2r)(1  )Z. (51)
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The condition 2 = 0 and 3 > 0 requires that a < (1 r)+ (e)=L+(1 2r)(1 )Z=L.
Subcase 2.2. 2 > 0
We have 3 = v 2 < v when 2 > 0. As equation (42) implies dc=d3 > 0, 3 < v
suggests c < c. Then the binding constraint (8) requires a > (1  r) + (e)=L+ (1 
2r)(1  )Z=L.
The analysis for the case of (1  a)p > (1  )Z is similar and is omitted.
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